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Abstract 
The paper compares different aggregates of aid financed global public goods and detects the 
presence, for the period 1995-2006, of the substitution effect between these aggregates and 
traditional aid that was found by former studies for earlier periods. A second focus of the 
paper  is on the differences in the importance that donors attach to the various types of global 
public goods, trying to detect regular patterns in their choices of financing. Statistical 
regularities, representative of common historical, social, cultural factors, for groups of 
countries (Anglo-Saxon, Northern European and Central European) give rise to the existence 
of a certain clusterized homogeneity in global public goods financing. Potential explanatory 
variables are examined in a panel analysis, which reveals the dominance of the donors’ 
wealth, preferences for public goods and public finance constraints in the decision of aid 
funding of global public goods. Finally, there is evidence that some global public goods with 
weakest-link technologies have become increasingly important at the global level. The 
increase in their financing through aid flows could be explained by the rich countries’ fear of 
an insufficient provision by poor countries, which, increasingly, cannot afford to pay for 
them: rich countries are therefore stepping in to avoid sub-optimal levels of provision, as 
already foreseen by Sandler (1998).  
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1. Introduction 
The current financing of international public goods (IPGs) is almost totally entrusted to 
national governments and it is the joint product of domestic public expenditure decision 
concerning research, knowledge development, defense, and environment protection. Only a 
minor share of IPGs are financed at the international level (0.5 per cent according to Kaul and 
Le Goulven, 2005). However, tracing direct and explicit IPG financing in specific headings of 
the national budgets is very difficult, as no separate accounting is generally provided for 
international programs. As far as we know, only Canada has promoted a two-track budgeting 
system to ensure that every ministry pays for the international mechanisms it benefits from.  
 For OECD-DAC countries, indirect financing of IPGs can be detected through the 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets, i.e. the aid and development funds to 
developing countries1. Since the 1980s, it has become a common practice to use aid funds for 
financing IPGs provision by developing countries2: te Velde et al.(2002) estimate the share of 
total aid spending allocated to IPGs to be nearly 5 per cent in 1980-82, 7 per cent in 1990-92, 
and close to 9 per cent in 1996.  
 The aid financing of IPGs is now recognized as one of the rationales behind 
development assistance, together with motivations of international solidarity and strategic, 
political, and economic self interest (Sagasti, 2005). However, the presence of lines of IPG 
financing inside aid funding have met both approval and criticism. On one hand, there is 
evidence of important relationships between cooperation for development and the provision 
of IPGs (Zedillo and Thiam, 2006) and each of them can be essential for the supply of the 
other. Limited development can hinder the provision of many IPGs that require sufficient 
capacity at national level as a pre-condition for an efficient delivery. IPG provision must 
sometimes ‘wait’ until this capacity has been built: for example, communicable disease 
control requires sufficiently developed national health sectors to deliver drugs, vaccines and 
the necessary health services in the whole countries, including the rural areas. 
Complementarity plays also in the opposite direction and some IPGs are critical for attracting 
private direct investment flows, for ensuring development financing and the effectiveness 
with which governments deliver national public goods.  
 On the other hand, global concerns can also have dubious impact on development and, 
in some cases, they can distort the whole structure of aid. For instance, this is the case for 
global security expenditures. “While domestic security in developing countries is a pre-
requisite for development efforts, the current emphasis on global security could highjack aid 
as the Cold War did for decades. The pursuit of narrow geo-political and security interests 
distorts aid allocation patterns, reduces resources available for human development and 
reinforces pernicious practices such as the provision of tied aid” (Sagasti, 2005, p. 11).  
Further criticisms to aid financing of IPGs have been advanced (Anand, 2004) on 
grounds of (i) ethics, as IPGs divert resources that should mainly directed to poverty 
reduction; (ii) efficiency, as institutions for development may not be the most appropriate for 
                                                 
1
 Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprises grants or loans to developing countries and territories 
on the OECD/DAC list of aid recipients that are undertaken by the official sector with promotion of economic 
development and welfare as the main objective and at concessional financial terms. 
2
 The World Bank (2001) estimated that t5he share of IPGs on total ODA was about 1 per cent in the 1970s. 
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IPG delivery; (iii) accountability, as IPG funding seems to take place without prior 
assessment of needs.  
 Concerns for coherence in aid programs and the fear that IPGs displace aid devoted to 
human development and poverty reduction have been growing since the 1990s: “if IPGs are 
less beneficial to at least to some poor countries than traditional aid, earmarking aid to IPGs 
would reduce the utility that developing countries can derive from aid“ (Reisen et al., 2004, p. 
28). Crowding out of aid-financed national public goods and development by IPG financing is 
all the more harmful when there exist complementarities between international and national 
public goods and between international goods and development expenditure. Thus, if 
spending on IPGs were to displace aid spending on complementary national public goods, the 
effect would weaken developing countries’ ability to provide IPGs (te Velde et al. 2002, p. 
142). A number of studies have searched for the presence and the size of the crowding-out 
effect and evidence has been found both in a strong (te Velde et al., 2002) and in a soft 
version (Reisen et al., 2004) for the 1980s and 1990s.  
 Notwithstanding the concerns that surround aid financing of IPGs, these seem to have 
been integrated within the “grand purpose” currently assigned to international development 
assistance, namely the managing of global interdependencies in a globalized world (Severino 
and Ray, 2009). The expanding range of global concerns that the international community 
faces, calls for a better understanding of the motivations behind IPGs financing through aid 
funds. Do donor countries consciously pursue the altruistic aim of increasing the total 
provision of IPGs from which every country in the world would benefit? Or do they expect 
nation-specific returns from their expenditures on IPGs? Are donor countries aware of the 
new task of managing global interdependencies assigned to ODA? Or are they just 
disillusioned with aid, thus egoistically diverting funds from development to seize the world-
wide benefits that IPGs provide? Why do donors not separate expenditures to development 
and poverty reduction from those to IPGs? Do donors keep IPGs financing together with 
development aid just to increase the ODA level and formally reach the Millennium targets on 
aid? Has the concern for some IPGs become so great that, fearing underprovision, developed 
countries are ready to finance the shares that less developed ones cannot afford to grant? Do 
donors take into account the provision technologies of IPGs and do they act cooperatively 
when required? 
 This paper tries to provide some tentative answers to these questions focusing on aid 
financing of those IPGs that can be termed global public goods (GPGs), i.e. that provide 
benefits that extend worldwide and that are globally non-rival and non-excludable. This 
excludes IPGs that are regional public goods and thus provide non-rival and non-excludable 
benefits only to a limited number of countries.  
 Two caveats must be made before presenting our answers to the above questions. 
First, IPGs are not solely responsible for the change in the patterns of aid that have been 
experienced since the 1990s. Other factors have played a relevant role as well: the major 
“identity crisis” experienced by official development assistance after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall (Severino and Ray, 2009), the changes in donors’ ideologies (Hjertholm and White, 
2000) and in the development paradigm, the acknowledgment of the limits in aid 
effectiveness, the combination of evolving strategic and trade interests, geo-political 
considerations, political alliances (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; 
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Canavire et al., 2005). A second caveat concerns a fundament limit of this research: the 
picture of GPGs financing would need to be completed with the consideration of explicit, 
non-ODA financing through the national budgets, which could complement or substitute for 
the share of GPGs that are funded through the ODA channels. 
  
1.1. Outline of the paper 
Estimates of aid financing of IPGs and GPGs vary a lot, ranging from 3.7 per cent (Anand, 
2002) to 12.5 per cent (1994-98; World Bank, 2001), to 16 per cent (1997-99; Reisen et al., 
2004) and to 25 per cent (Raffer, 1999). These differences are almost entirely attributable to 
differences in the definition of what “international/global” is3. In the line of Reisen et al. 
(2004), we construct our definitions of GPGs according to the spatial dimension of the aid 
financed activities and we include only those activities whose benefits spread worldwide. 
When possible, we also try to make reference to the third dimension of ‘publicness’ of GPGs, 
namely their ‘aggregation technology’, or the manner in which contributions determine the 
aggregate provision level.   
 Our estimates of GPGs financing include the update of Reisen et al. (2004) aggregate 
(from now on GPG_OECD) and the introduction of two new aggregates. The first is designed 
to capture the GPGs that should be financed to attain the Millennium Development Goals 
(GPG_MDG); the second aggregate (GPG_E) broadens the OECD definition by including 
new sectors. This second aggregate will be used as our benchmark.  
 The paper then develops along the following lines. First, we search for the presence of 
a substitution effect, where the financing of IPGs displaces other aid spending (te Welde, 
2002; Reisen et al., 2004), for the period 1995-2006. With respect to previous studies, we 
compare the effect of the adoption of different definitions of GPGs on the substitution effect 
and we try to show the relevance of this effect for the single donor countries.  
The second objective is to focus on differences in the importance that donors attach to 
the various types of GPGs (as it is done also by te Velde et al., 2002), trying to detect a 
regular pattern in their choices of financing. The paper adds to previous studies by extending 
the analysis to multilateral aid financing of GPGs. Multilateral financing, which implies 
common-pool funding, gives donors less control over their donations than bilateral aid4. It, 
thus, offers fewer occasions for strategic behavior. However, it is an increasingly important 
source of GPGs financing.  
Then, the analysis focuses on a larger number of determinant variables for GPG 
financing, which are subsumed under two dominant types: preferences and constraints. We 
investigate whether preferences for redistribution and national public goods financing within 
the donor countries influence their choice of GPG financing and which role is played by 
donors’ openness to the rest of the world and their altruistic concern for recipient countries. 
                                                 
3
 According to Birdsall (2006) and OECD (2004), regional public goods amounted to 23.9 per cent in 1997 and 
to 14.9 per cent in 2002. These data refer to a broad definition of regional public goods, which captures any 
support that might have spillover effects into neighbouring countries. When employing a stricter definition of a 
regional public good, including only projects with clear transborder properties (region-wide air transport, river 
development, rail  transport, protection and pest control), the  amount of development assistance for regional 
public goods is about 6 percent for 1997 and to less than 3 percent for 2002 (Birdsall,2006). 
4
 There is, however, evidence that international agencies foster the interests of donors when disbursing funds 
(Neumayer, 2003). In particular, large donor countries seem to derive donor-specific benefits. 
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The state of donors’ public finances acts as a constraint. However, even if aid could be one of 
the first budgetary items to be cut in case of budgetary strains, GPGs could move in different 
directions. When GPGs are of primary concern, such as health emergencies are, their 
financing through aid could be kept or even increased.   
Using data from 1995 to 2006 for 22 countries, we first perform a statistical analysis 
of the correlations between ODA and GPG expenditures and their potential determinants. 
Then, through a panel analysis, we estimate the donors’ committed expenditure to aid funded 
GPGs and we evaluate the relevance of different explanatory variables.  
 The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the definitions of 
GPGs adopted. Section 3 offers a description of the evolution of aid financed GPGs from 
1995 to 2006 and Section 4 presents a more detailed analysis of bilateral and multilateral 
financing by donors and categories of intervention. Section 5 presents the analysis of the 
determinants of ODA and GPGs and Section 6 presents the results of the estimation of a GPG 
financing supply function through a panel analysis. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Data and definitions of GPGs 
The estimates of aid financing of GPGs provided in this paper are based on the Aid Activity 
database of the DAC-OECD, i.e. the Creditor Reporting system (CRS), which offers a sector 
allocation of aid based on common definitions agreed by all DAC countries. The CRS data 
refer to payments and commitments by DAC countries and multilateral organizations5 and to 
total flows (grants and loans). The estimates of GPGs provided in this paper are given for 
bilateral and multilateral levels, by categories and by donors and they include both loans and 
grants, as, in general, the GPGs financing is not peculiarly skewed towards grant-financing as 
compared to ODA (Anand, 2004, p. 231)6.   
 The CRS database records flows according to 194 sectors of destination, which are 
selected according to their local, regional or global dimension. This choice involves a degree 
of arbitrariness, as the distinction between global, regional, and national goods is not always 
uncontroversial. Table A.1 provides a summary of the different definitions adopted in some 
previous analyses of aid spending on international public goods (World Bank, 2001; te Velde 
et al., 2002; Reisen et al., 2004). 
 The main difference between this paper and previous studies by the World Bank 
(2001) and te Velde et al. (2002), is that the latter refer to IPGs (both global and regional 
public goods) and that they include in their definition only those CRS sectors that are related 
to “core” activities. For example, they completely exclude the sector ‘Economic and financial 
governance’, as the CRS data base does not provide separate statistics for the core and non-
core activities included in it and does not distinguish the financing allocated to the support of 
global economic integration (non-core activity) or to the participation in global forums (core 
                                                 
5
 The time series for gross disbursements starts from 2002. 
6
 On the contrary, Mascarenhas and Sandler (2004) argue that grants are the most appropriate form of aid for 
financing spillovers associated with IPG. They test the hypothesis that the share of grants in aid reflects the 
importance of spillover effects and find that the mean grant share is highest for knowledge IPG (95 per cent for 
bilateral donors and 82 per cent for multilateral donors) and health IPG (respectively 90 and 83 per cent) and 
lowest for governance (81 per cent for bilateral donors and 85 per cent for multilateral donors) and environment 
(83 per cent for bilateral donors and 81 per cent for multilateral donors). 
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activity): economic and financial governance is treated as a complementary activity that is 
national in range7. On the other hand, they include the expenditures for preventing or 
alleviating the effects of conflicts, as these provide regional security benefits. World Bank 
(2001) includes post-conflict reconstruction and mine clearing, while te Velde et al. (2002) 
treat them as national public goods. Te Velde et al. (2002) also exclude emergency relief and 
aid to refugees, which are instead core activities according to World Bank (2001). 
 As in Reisen et al. (2004), this study distinguishes CRS activities according to a spatial 
dimension and focuses on ODA flows with a global spatial dimension. This implies excluding 
some activities that are “core” according to the World Bank, but which have a limited spatial 
dimension, for example, “post-conflict peace building of the United Nations peace 
operations” or “land mine clearance”, which have national/regional spatial dimension. On the 
contrary, the present study includes the expenditures for “narcotics control activities” that are 
functional to the provision of the global good ‘Crime control’, whose benefits have a global 
scale8.  
The activities included in the data set present different degrees of non-rivalry and non-
exclusivity (Arce and Sandler, 2002) and they are produced through the contributions of 
donor countries, which are aggregated according to different technologies: summation, 
weighted sum, weakest link and best shot technologies (Arce and Sandler, 2002; Stansfield et 
al. 2002). Available data of CRS sectors are too aggregated to enable to fully take into 
account the aggregation technology of each GPG: nonetheless, some tentative general 
considerations are provided. From the CRS database, 59 CRS sectors9 are aggregated into the 
following categories, which are standard in the literature (Zedillo and Thiam, 2006) and 
which will build the GPG aggregates:    
 
Knowledge generation and dissemination. Knowledge can be generated by best-shot and/or 
summation technologies and this influences the direction of the financing flows. For example, 
vaccine development research has both summation and best-shot aggregation patterns 
(Stansfield et al., 2002). From the CRS database, we have chosen all sectors related to 
research, the building of statistical capacity and the financing to scientific institutions, 
excluding education provision, which is essentially a national good. 
  
Human rights. Reisen et al. (2004) treats the protection of human rights and the working for 
gender equality and women’s empowerment as GPGs. On the contrary we deem that the 
benefits they generate are basically national, although their protection raises international 
concerns. Besides, we deem that treating human rights as GPGs is not appropriate, as they 
themselves are the reason for the provision of many GPGs (right to health, right to clean 
                                                 
7
 The argument is that establishing global institutions to coordinate the provision or to directly provide 
international public goods is a core activity. Providing financial stability in one country is not an international 
public good; however, it is considered a complementary activity as it contributes to the overall stability and to 
the governance in that country. Besides, building governance capacity, especially in the context of economic 
policy and management, confers public benefits only at national level and is a complementary activity 
(Morrissey, 2002). 
8
 For a detailed description of the CRS sectors employed see Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
9
 The list of the CRS sectors employed here and in OECD (2004) and their description are detailed in Table A.2 
in the Annex. 
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water or air, right to education; Bizzarri, 2005). Thus, this category will be present only in the 
GPG_OECD aggregate. 
 
Communicable disease control. Although the provision of health services is a national good, 
the expenditures for communicable disease control are global in their effects. From the CRS 
database, we choose two sectors: activities related to the prevention, control and combat of 
sexually transmitted (including HIV/AIDS10) and activities related to infectious diseases 
control (excluding tuberculosis and malaria, which have regional coverage). Available data 
cannot enable us to distinguish activities according to the proportion of benefits that can be 
ascribed to a local dimension and the one that has an international range. Besides, the two CRS 
sectors employed include activities that exhibit a mixture of aggregation technologies. For 
instance, finding a cure for AIDS or preventing the spread of a disease are best shot 
technologies. Disease prevention, elimination or eradication programs display weakest-link 
patterns of aggregation, because the smallest effort fixes the level of the global good 
provision. Controlling pest needs a weighted sum technology, as each country’s contribution 
has different additive impact (Stansfield et al., 2002).  
 
Global governance. As already mentioned, both the World Bank (2001) and te Velde et al. 
(2002) exclude economic governance. Following Reisen et al. (2004), we include those 
activities that support the governing of international economic relations (such as trade, 
investment) and the macroeconomic and financial stability of developing countries. These 
activities are generally provided by summation technologies. 
 
Crime control and global peace. Differently from World Bank (2001) and te Velde et al. 
(2002), we exclude from ‘Global Peace’ the reintegration of demobilized military personnel 
or land mine clearance, as they have a national or regional spatial dimension. On the contrary, 
we include the narcotics control activities that are functional to ‘Crime control’ on a global 
scale: these activities are often provided by a weakest/weaker link technology.  
 
Global commons and sustainability. Environmental goods have a global public nature: 
biosphere protection, biodiversity protection, environmental projects related to fishery, and 
forestry policy are of global importance. All kinds of production technologies are present in 
this category, with a dominance of the summation type. Following Barrett (2005), we deem 
that the absence of climate change is a GPG and that addressing it would require new 
technologies that produce energy without emitting greenhouse gases. Therefore, in our 
estimates we include all activities related to alternative energy sources, which are classified as 
national goods by te Velde et al. (2002).  
 
Communications. This category includes the CRS activities named Communications policy 
(policy, planning and programs, including postal service development), Telecommunications 
(telephone networks, telecommunications satellites) and the Free flow of information, which 
                                                 
10
 It is debatable whether HIV control and combat is a regional or a global public goods. The fact that mutations 
in the HIV genes in less developed countries have deep repercussions on the treatment in developed countries, 
makes us inclined to register the related activities as global goods. 
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we deem to have global spillovers. Production technologies are of the summation and of the 
weakest-link types. 
 
The above categories are employed to construct three aggregates of GPGs (Table 1). The first 
one is built according to Reisen et al. (2004) definition (GPG_OECD): it includes 
Knowledge, Human rights, Communicable disease control, Global governance, Crime control 
and global peace, Global commons and sustainability. Differently from Reisen et al. (2004), 
we include all types of financing (grants and loans). The second aggregate, named 
Millennium Global Goods, includes the key GPGs that are relevant for the Millennium 
Development Goals11 (GPG_MDG), as indicated by the UK Department for International 
Development (Speight, 2002): Knowledge, Communicable disease control, Global commons 
and sustainability, Global Governance. The third aggregate, which will be the benchmark in 
the discussion, is the largest one (GPG_E), as it includes the GPG_MDG categories plus 
Communications and Crime control and global peace. Both the GPG_MDG and the GPG_E 
aggregates exclude the category Human rights, which is a permanent concern at international 
level, but whose benefits are basically national.   
  
 
Table 1 – Definitions of GPGs 
 
Categories included GPG_OECD GPG_MDG GPG_E 
Knowledge generation and dissemination √ √ √ 
Human rights √   
Communicable disease control √ √ √ 
Global governance √ √ √ 
Crime control and peace building √  √ 
Global commons and sustainability √ √ √ 
Communications   √ 
  
 
As Table A.2 in the Appendix shows, the categories of GPGs we employ in the MDG and E 
aggregates do not match perfectly those chosen by Reisen et al. (2004), as we have added or 
removed some sectors. These changes affect especially Global commons, Crime control and 
Global Governance. For example, differently from Reisen et al. (2004), we include Conflict 
prevention and Post-conflict peace building in the category Crime control and global peace, as 
contemporary conflicts have all global spillovers and exert their influence on the world 
balance of powers (wars in Iraq, Israel and Palestinian, Georgia are examples of this). 
Besides, differently from the choices made by Reisen et al. (2004) for the Global commons 
category, we exclude the activities related to Family planning (planning services, counseling, 
                                                 
11
 The Goals for the Millennium include: eradicate extreme poverty, achieve universal primary education, 
promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, develop a global partnership for 
development. In 2000 the additional amount of aid needed to finance these goals was estimated to be USD 50 
billion per year, while the Zedillo Report (2001) estimated that an adequate financing of international public 
goods would require at least USD 20 billion per year in addition.  
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information, education, delivery of contraceptives), which, we deem, have a national/regional 
dimension, and those related to the hydro-electric power plants, as they are often an element 
of environment disruption rather than promotion. 
 GPG aggregates are given in 2000 constant USD and expressed as shares on GDP, on 
ODA and also on ODA as corrected for debt forgiveness (ODAT). Debt forgiveness is 
retroactively recognized by the DAC accounting system as ODA grants, but it does not 
correspond to actual financial flows. This correction allows a better assessment of the actual 
transfers and of the shares of GPGs, as these latter are financed only out of actual financial 
flows. The total period 1995-2006 is considered as a whole and in three sub-periods, which 
are determined according to significant trends in the financing of ODA and GPGs: 1995-
1998, 1999-2002 and 2003-2006. 
 
 
3. Trends in aid financing to GPGs: 1995-2006 
While the 1990s were characterized by aid stagnation due to the re-thinking of development 
policies after the end of the Cold War, the subsequent years saw an encouraging rise in ODA, 
due to the impulse of the global debate on poverty reduction, that took place at the beginning 
of the new millennium (Millennium Summit, 2000), and of the pledges of aid scale-up, 
renewed at the Monterrey (2002) and Gleneagles (2005) summits (Graph 1).  
 
 
Graph 1 – ODA financing of GPGs (%): 1995-2006  
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In the whole period 1995-2006, the volume of aid increased more than three times in current 
terms and by about 150 per cent in real terms: the evolution is less marked, when ODA is 
corrected for debt forgiveness. The UN target of aid to GDP (0.7 per cent by 2015) is still far 
from being honored, although the economic significance and the assumptions upon which it 
was determined have been seriously challenged (Clemens and Moss, 2007).   
 Out of the total aid financing, a share of 11 per cent was devoted to the largest 
aggregate of GPGs in 1995: twelve years later this share has grown to 15.3 per cent (Graph 
1), which is not an impressive rise. On a still minor scale (+ 2.2 p.p.), a similar rise can be 
detected also for the OECD and the MDG aggregates. For both aid and GPGs financing, 
turning points in the period seem to be associated with world summits and international 
conferences. The largest part of aid is provided by bilateral financing (73 per cent on average; 
70.7 per cent on average when corrected for debt forgiveness). Bilateral aid is also the largest 
source of GPGs financing (about 76 per cent on average for the E aggregate).  
 
3.1 Searching for a crowding out effect in bilateral aid financing of GPGs 
Depending on the definition adopted, GPGs represent a share of between 7 and 14 per cent of 
bilateral ODA. Table 2 shows the trend of these shares: a decline from 1995 to 1999, an 
upward surge from 2000 to 2002, some oscillations thereafter. The largest increase can be 
observed for the expanded definition: from 12.2 to 14 per cent. Higher shares of GPGs 
financing can be observed when ODA is corrected for debt forgiveness: the range of the ratios 
to ODAT goes then from 7.5 to 17.4 per cent.  
 As Reisen et al. (2004) analysis reports, “there is no straightforward way to test for 
crowding-out” (p. 28) associated to aid financed GPGs. The methodology adopted in the 
present study compares the growth rates of the ODA/GDP ratio and those of the GPG_i/ODA 
ratio (i represents one of the three possible aggregates adopted), as in te Velde et al. (2002) . 
The possible cases are: 
1- absence of substitution effect: the share of resources devoted to ODA increases while 
the financing to GPG_i out of ODA keeps constant, diminishes or increases less;  
2- substitution effect: 
- only on the incremental side: the ODA/GDP ratio and the GPG_i/ODA ratio 
increase at the same rate, meaning that every additional dollar spent in ODA is 
earmarked for GPGs;  
- complete: the GPG_i ratio on ODA increases more than ODA/GDP, implying 
that not only new resources are spent for GPGs but that the precedent 
allocation of ODA resources is now changed in favour of GPGs. 
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Table 2  - Bilateral aid and GPGs financing: 1995-2006 ( %) 
 
 Shares on ODA Shares on ODAT 
 
ODA/GDP GPG_E 
 
GPG_MD
G  
 
GPG_OE
CD 
 
ODAT/G
DP GPG_E 
 
GPG_MD
G 
 
GPG_OE
CD 
 
1995 0.176 12.20 10.60 14.84 0.168 12.76 11.09 15.53 
1996 0.185 12.58 10.58 14.79 0.178 13.06 10.99 15.36 
1997 0.162 11.40 9.76 13.52 0.155 11.92 10.20 14.14 
1998 0.175 10.14 8.37 12.02 0.159 11.14 9.19 13.21 
1999 0.199 9.74 7.08 10.94 0.186 10.40 7.56 11.68 
2000 0.204 12.00 7.33 12.98 0.193 12.71 7.77 13.74 
2001 0.196 13.44 10.54 14.92 0.182 14.40 11.29 15.99 
2002 0.226 13.55 10.22 14.31 0.199 15.42 11.63 16.29 
2003 0.280 11.69 8.09 10.85 0.245 13.40 9.26 12.43 
2004 0.269 13.81 10.40 13.96 0.243 15.29 11.52 15.45 
2005 0.345 12.66 9.63 12.77 0.257 16.98 12.92 17.14 
2006 0.341 13.98 10.44 14.08 0.275 17.30 12.91 17.43 
Source: elaborations on OECD-CRS.  
Notes: ODA transfers (ODAT) exclude debt forgiveness items from ODA. 
 
  
 
 
  
The regression analysis proposed by te Velde et al. (2002) for the period 1980-98 is 
performed  for sub periods from 1995 to 2006 and for  all definitions,: 
 
(1)           ∆gpgd it/oda = γ+ β ∆odait/gdp+ γ1TD95-98+ γ2TD99-02 
 
where ∆ is the first difference operator, necessary to eliminate the country-specific effect and 
to focus on the change between periods in each country; gpgdit/oda  is the share of GPGs 
financed by ODA for country i at time t  for the three definitions (d) of GPGs considered; 
odait/gdp is the share of ODA spending on GDP and TD is a time dummy for the three sub-
periods considered. The same regressions are performed then for aid transfers (ODAT). We 
expect that changes in the ODA/GDP ratio entail changes of the same sign in the GPG/ODA 
ratio   
The results (Tables 3.a and 3.b) for the three definitions of GPGs show that β is 
positive, as expected, but not significant and that the changes in the share of GPGs are 
significantly determined only by the time dummies for all the sub-periods. This result 
confirms the findings obtained by te Velde et al.: the share of GPGs is explained by the 
erosion of other forms of aid spending. This result is even stronger when the ODA/GDP ratio 
is replaced with the ODA transfers ratio: in fact, the coefficients of the time dummies and the 
explanatory power of the regression are higher (Table 3.b). The choice of the aggregate of 
GPGs makes no dramatic difference in the statistical significance of the results. However, the 
coefficients of the time dummies and the explanatory power of the regression are higher for 
the extended aggregate (E).   
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Table 3 – Do aid financed GPGs crowd out other forms of aid expenditure? 
a) GPG and total bilateral aid  
 
∆gpgi/oda = β ∆oda/gdp+ γ1TD95-98+ γ2TD99-02+γTD03-06 
 
gpg_e/oda Coeff. gpg_mdg/oda Coeff. gpg_oecd/oda Coeff. 
oda/gdp .349786 oda/gdp 3.805355 oda/gdp 3.467516 
TD95-98 10.82204* TD95-98 7.819874* TD95-98 11.14259* 
TD99-02 12.01694* TD99-02 7.294383* TD99-02 10.46597* 
TD03-06 11.6144* TD03-06 7.112651* TD03-06 9.498748* 
Num obs. 216 Num obs. 216 Num obs. 216 
R-squared 0.7802 R-squared 0.7506 R-squared 0.7149 
 
b) GPG and bilateral aid transfers 
 ∆gpgi/odat = β ∆odat/gdp+ γ1TD95-98+ γ2TD99-02+γTD03-06 
 
gpg_e/oda Coeff. gpg_mdg/oda Coeff. gpg_oecd/odat Coeff. 
odat/gdp -.312754 odat/gdp 3.458632 odat/gdp 2.883462 
TD95-98 11.53154* TD95-98 8.418438* TD95-98 11.93041* 
TD99-02 13.4598* TD99-02 8.11459* TD99-02 11.51061* 
TD03-06 13.69216* TD03-06 8.893738* TD03-06 11.88989* 
Num obs. 216 Num obs. 216 Num obs. 216 
R-squared 0.8134 R-squared 0.7772 R-squared 0.7448 
Note: subscript i is referred to one of the three definitions of global goods (E, MDG, OECD). Pooled ordinary 
least squares estimates. * significant at 5%. 
 
 
 Table 4 offers a crude measure of the displacement effect in the DAC country, by 
presenting the differences between the growth rate of the GPG_E/ODAT ratio and the growth 
rate of ODAT. Countries are ranked according to the relevance of the displacement effect, 
whose presence is implied by a positive value of that difference. 
 The results show, in general, great dynamism in donors’ behavior. Some countries, 
like the US, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, which in the sub-period 1995-1999 displaced, on 
average, other forms of aid by GPG financing, have reversed this trend in more recent years. 
An opposite trend, from no displacement towards displacement, has been followed by 
Australia, France, and the UK, while the group of the Central European countries plus Italy 
continue to increase the presence of  GPGs at the expenses of other forms of aid spending.  
Explanations for the irregular patterns of the substitution effect can be found in the 
interplay of different factors: i) global emergencies that require the provision of GPGs 
(Barrett, 2007), such as global diseases, global environmental risks, international anti-terrorist 
or anti-drug campaigns; ii) a change in the donors’ balance between the benefits from aid 
financed GPGs and the benefits that donors derive from development aid (strategic and trade 
interests, geo-political considerations, colonial ties); iii) the increasing awareness of the 
ineffectiveness of some forms of traditional aid and the so-called ‘aid fatigue’; iv) the 
increasing world-wide inequality in income distribution (Sandler, 1998) and thus the rich 
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countries’ awareness of the necessity of increasing their contributions to the financing of 
GPGs, especially those with weakest or weaker link technologies that poorest countries 
cannot afford to pay.  
We leave open the question whether this erosion signifies a shift from generosity to 
greater selfishness by donor countries in times of declining prosperity and public finance 
difficulties. Alternatively, the displacement effect could signify a ‘selfish’ reassessment of the 
donor-specific gains from development aid compared with the world-wide benefits from 
GPGs. Sections 4 and 5 offer some tentative answers. 
 
 
Table 4 - Ranking  over the substitution effect of GPGs:  
ODA transfers financing to GPG_E and to other forms of aid 
 
 1995-98 1999-02 2003-06 
 
Difference 
in average 
growth 
rates* 
Rank 
based on  
difference 
Difference 
in average 
growth 
rates* 
Rank 
based on  
difference 
Difference 
in average 
growth 
rates* 
Rank 
based on  
difference 
Italy 38.76 1 -8.85 12 10.92 4 
Germany 33.37 2 -19.39 16 4.18 6 
Switzerland 27.97 3 29.69 1 15.50 3 
Denmark 23.11 4 -14.77 15 10.86 5 
Belgium 21.38 5 19.08 2 28.74 2 
Sweden 21.33 6 10.35 4 -12.19 15 
Finland 12.40 7 -12.47 13 -5.51 10 
United States 7.66 8 -104.31 18 -66.32 22 
Norway 6.68 9 -13.93 14 -7.55 11 
Netherlands -2.07 10 1.91 9 -12.02 14 
Canada -3.77 11 -29.69 17 -54.18 21 
United Kingdom -11.51 12 7.54 6 1.51 7 
Japan -13.68 13 8.78 5 -21.74 19 
Spain -19.45 14 18.51 3 -13.03 18 
France -21.38 15 0.97 10 -1.02 9 
Australia -78.21 16 0.03 11 31.78 1 
Austria .. .. 4.48 8 -12.39 16 
Greece .. .. 5.73 7 0.002 8 
Ireland .. .. .. .. -11.73 13 
Luxembourg .. .. .. .. -12.91 17 
New Zealand .. .. .. .. -8.18 12 
Portugal .. .. .. .. -27.26 20 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD-CRS. ODAT excludes debt forgiveness items from ODA. * 
Positive differences between the growth rate of  the GPG_E/ODAT ratio and the growth rate of ODAT imply the 
presence of a substitution effect. When the difference is zero there is substitution effect only on the incremental 
side. A negative value for the difference implies no substitution effect. 
 
 
3.2  An increasing trend in multilateral aid financing to GPGs 
Multilateral aid contributes on average to 26.3 per cent of total ODA and to 29.2 per cent of 
total ODA transfers. If compared to bilateral aid, commitments on multilateral aid to GDP 
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grow more smoothly, probably due to the more stable financing that programs promoted by 
multilateral agencies enjoy (Graph 2). As debt forgiveness is almost irrelevant for multilateral 
aid, the trend of multilateral ODAT replicates that of multilateral ODA.  
   
 
Graph 2 –Multilateral aid and aid transfers and shares of GPGs: 1995-2006 
(constant USD, million and %) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS. Notes: ODA transfers excludes debt forgiveness items 
from ODA. Left-hand scale is referred to total multilateral ODA and multilateral ODAT. Right-hand scale is 
referred to the shares of global goods to multilateral ODA for the three definitions. 
  
 
The aggregate E of GPGs represents 8 per cent of multilateral ODA at the beginning of the 
period and reaches 16 per cent in 2006. GPGs compete with other aid spending in multilateral 
financing. Their average annual growth (Table 5) is about 7.8-8.4 per cent, while it is about 
4.5 per cent for total multilateral ODA. In the sub-periods, the rates of growth for GPGs are 
always higher than those of multilateral aid for all aggregates12. This means that international 
financing has increasingly financed those multilateral agencies whose mission is the provision 
of GPGs, such as the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) or the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFTAM).  
 A crowding out effect can thus be detected also for multilateral aid, in the sense that 
multilateral programs have been increasingly directed towards global goods provision. As for 
bilateral aid, this change in the target of multilateral financing can be explained either because 
GPGs are in some cases a pre-requisite for the provision of development aid, or because 
                                                 
12
 Data for debt forgiveness are irrelevant for multilateral aid. 
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donors in international agencies have increasingly required the financing of goods with 
worldwide spillovers from which they would themselves benefit. When at international level 
the decision to contribute is a voluntary one and “[...] the arrangements are to raise the monies 
needed, they must somehow make it in the interests of the countries to contribute (Barrett, 
2007, p. 105)”. 
 
 
Table 5 – Average rates of growth of multilateral aid financing to GPGs(1995-2006) 
 Av. 
Annual 
Rate of 
growth 
1995-
2006 
Av. 
Annual 
Rate of 
Growth 
1995-
1998 
Av. 
Annual 
Rate of 
Growth 
1999-
2002 
Av. 
Annual 
Rate of 
Growth 
2003-
2006 
Multilateral ODA/GDP 4.46 8.91 -0.62 6.19 
GPG_E/Multilateral ODA 7.89 9.55 2.75 11.78 
GPG_MDG/Multilateral ODA 7.80 9.31 0.95 13.53 
GPG_OECD/Multilateral ODA 8.45 11.28 3.16 11.61 
               Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS.  
 
 
 
4.  The composition of aid financing to GPGs  
This section gives insights into the composition of aid financing of GPGs according to the six 
categories into which they are grouped. When examining bilateral aid financing, the focus is 
first on the pattern of financing displayed by single donors and then on their composition.  
 The composition and the evolution of the aid financing to GPGs between 1995-1997 
and 2004-2006 are summarized in Graph 3 for the E aggregate which is the only one we 
consider in this section13. Expenditures for the Global commons and sustainability, which 
represented the largest share of total financing in 1995-1997, have substantially decreased in 
time as a share on the total GPGs. A reduction is detected also for the expenditures on 
Communications. Both categories have been substituted by Communicable disease control, 
which covered only 9 per cent of the expenditures in 1995-1997 and reaches 28.3 per cent 
twelve years later. Expenditures on Crime control and Global peace also represent an 
increasing share of financing. Therefore, we observe both an increase in aid financed GPGs 
and a change in their composition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 According to the World Bank (2001) most of the IPGs financing was devoted to health and knowledge 
(agricultural and other research) in the 1970s. 
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Graph 3 – The composition of total, bilateral and multilateral aid financing of GPGs (GPG_E) 
(av. 1995-1998 and 2003-2006; %) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS.  
 
 
 
 Higher growth rates are observable by the categories which include GPGs provided by 
weakest-link technologies: Crime control and Communicable disease control. GPGs provided 
mostly by summation or best-shot technologies (Communication, Knowledge generation and 
dissemination, Global governance) show lower and sometimes negative growth rates. Global 
commons, which includes GPGs with a dominance of summation technologies, presents the 
worst trend.  
  These trends convey the idea that some GPGs, and in particular those with weakest-
link technologies, have become increasingly important at the global level: health emergencies, 
such as SARS or avian flu, and crime control emergency, that spur aid to narcotics control to 
cut one of the main sources of financing to terrorist activities. At the same time, the 
contributions from poorer countries, which are usually also the weakest-link nations, have 
probably fallen behind the level desired by the richer donors. To avoid a suboptimal provision 
of weakest-link GPGs, richest nations have increased their participation in the financing of 
weakest-link GPGs. This observation supports Sandler’s (1998) anticipation of the increase in 
the sub-optimality of provision levels of weakest-link GPGs, “unless the richest countries 
either subsidize the poorest countries’ provision or else step in and provide the public goods 
for these poor countries” (Sandler, 1998, p. 235).  
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4.1 Ranking donors  
Bilateral donors tend to finance four categories of GPGs (Graph 3): Crime control, 
Communicable disease control, Global governance and Global commons. The first three 
present a sustained growth in the period, while the expenditures for environment are declining 
in time. In 2003-2006, the largest share of financing is devoted to Communicable disease 
control (25.5 per cent), while twelve years before the expenditure for environmental global 
goods had the primacy (45.5 per cent).  
 Graph 4 and 5 shows the different role played by DAC countries in GPGs financing at 
the extremes of the period. On average, donors devoted 9 per cent of their ODA financing to 
GPGs in 1995-1998 (Graph 4). This share reached its lowest values in Austria (3.6 per cent) 
and Portugal (1.2 per cent). Some countries (Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, and New Zealand) 
had no financing of GPGs at the time. Eleven donors had shares of GPGs to bilateral ODA 
larger than 9.7 per cent, reaching the maximum values for the Nordic countries, Australia and 
the US (22 per cent).  Twelve years later (Graph 5), in 2003-2006, we observe a general 
increase in bilateral ODA financing of GPGs. All countries, without an exception, devote part 
of their bilateral aid to GPGs. Six of them have decreased their financing, Belgium and the 
US have kept their shares more or less constant and all the others have increased them14. 
 The ratios of GPGs financing to ODA change, when we correct ODA for debt 
forgiveness. The relevance of debt forgiveness is very uneven among DAC counties in the 
period. It is null for Luxembourg, New Zealand, Ireland, and Greece and almost insignificant 
for Norway, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden, while it represents a significant 
share of aid for some countries: 55 per cent of aid in Austria and 50.6 per cent for Italy in the 
years 2003-06. When we apply this correction, the shares of global goods financing increase 
for the countries that have significant values of debt forgiveness. Then, in 2003-06, about 10 
per cent of Austria aid financing results to be devoted to GPGs, and also Italy’s tiny share on 
ODA increases from 4 to 6.3 per cent. Also UK, Belgium, France and Germany present 
increases in their shares of GPGs financing by 3-4 p.p. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Our results are in line with those of te Velde et al. (2002). For the years 1996-98, they find that only Austria 
and Portugal allocated less than 5 per cent of aid to IPGs and seven countries allocated more than 10 per cent (in 
ascending order Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, France, Finland, Australia with 19.1 per cent). 
However, they find that in the same period the US devoted only 8.5 per cent of ODA to IPGs. 
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Graph 4 – Bilateral aid financing of GPG_E (%, 1995-98) 
-150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150
-50
0
50
100
under 4.479347
4.479347 - 9.735744
9.735744 - 12.746551
over 12.746551
 
 
Graph 5 – Bilateral aid financing of GPG_E (%, 2003-06) 
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  Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data 
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In order to better assess the position of each donor country in GPGs financing, 
countries are first ordered in ascending order in terms of their average GNI15, a proxy not only 
for ability-to-pay but also for benefits from GPG provision, as in Barrett (2007). This ranking 
is then compared to the ranking according to the donors’ share of GPG_E on bilateral ODA 
(Table 6). An increasing gap between donors’ potential appropriable benefits and their 
contribution to GPGs can be observed, as we move from Anglo-Saxon countries and Northern 
Europe to Southern Europe. The Northern European countries’ contribution to GPGs exceeds 
their position as contributors and potential beneficiaries. Among the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
the US are characterized by a perfectly coherent relation of benefit-contribution, while 
Canada, Ireland and New Zealand tend to contribute more and the UK less than their rank in 
the GNI. Italy, instead, shows a downward trend in its share of global goods financing even if 
its average GNI would imply increasing benefits from GPGs. 
  
 
Table 6 - Ranking over GNI vs ranking over the share of GPG_E on bilateral ODA 
 
 1995-1998 1999-2002 2002-2006 
Rank 
based 
on 
GNI 
 
GNI  
 
Share 
of 
GPG_
E (%) 
Rank 
based 
on 
share 
 
GNI 
 
Share 
of 
GPG_
E (%) 
Rank 
based 
on 
share 
 
GNI 
 
Share 
of 
GPG_
E (%) 
Rank 
based 
on 
share 
1 USA 8,542,457.87 22.18 1 USA 
10,053,068.2
6 22.51 1 USA 11,105,166.47 22.45 1 
2 JP  3,219,193.44 8.83 13 JP 3,280,263.48 5.81 15 JP  3,452,567.97 6.76 17 
3 D 1,983,742.64 7.11 14 D  2,114,736.55 8.85 13 D 2,221,515.32 8.70 13 
4 F  1,385,267.73 10.16 11 F  1,560,443.07 5.26 16 GB 1,745,752.97 13.63 7 
5 I  1,351,770.65 7.07 15 GB  1,555,740.94 16.62 3 F 1,670,348.31 7.01 16 
6 GB 1,344,035.21 10.29 10 I  1,457,033.30 4.19 17 I  1,520,511.22 4.10 19 
7 CA 719,964.58 11.07 9 CA 851,973.56 12.07 8 CA  957,980.28 16.17 3 
8 AU  442,669.28 18.69 2 AU  522,640.62 17.45 2 AU  616,908.32 13.19 10 
9 NL 407,225.46 12.72 7 NL  475,080.37 9.30 12 NL 507,573.55 13.76 5 
10 B 264,284.14 9.05 12 B 288,180.22 10.84 9 B 304,769.60 8.51 14 
11 CH 218,287.84 13.30 5 SE 243,314.13 12.98 6 SE  269,575.19 13.75 6 
12 SE 216,344.20 12.76 6 CH 239,272.65 16.26 4 CH 263,528.20 12.23 11 
13 A 205,656.44 3.62 16 A 226,656.23 8.67 14 A  245,259.28 6.65 18 
14 GR 181,056.43 0.00 17 GR  206,219.77 0.00 18 GR 242,223.09 21.04 2 
15 NO  138,408.49 13.64 4 NO  162,292.01 13.86 5 NO 183,438.85 15.11 4 
16 DK  136,707.64 11.90 8 DK  150,993.72 10.17 10 DK  166,429.73 13.35 9 
17 FIN 112,514.69 15.03 3 FIN 133,761.44 12.32 7 FIN 147,107.31 13.62 8 
18 IRE  71,438.05 0.00 17 IRE  95,617.00 9.80 11 IRE 119,149.75 11.75 12 
19 NZ 67,932.74 0.00 17 NZ  772,73.31 0.00 18 NZ  902,26.27 7.85 15 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. 
Note: Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg are excluded because of absence of GNI data. GNI data are averages in 
constant 2000 USD. 
                                                 
15
 “The benefits of supplying global public goods will not be proportional to this measure [GNI] ( benefits  may 
increase with income at a decreasing rate), but they will tend to be correlated with this measure. Bigger and 
richer countries usually benefit the most” (Barrett, 2007, p.113).    
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Even if Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006) suggest that donors’ decisions on how much 
aid to allocate are generally independent of the actions of other donors, we can detect groups 
of donors that display more homogeneous patterns of global goods financing (Table 7). 
Anglo-Saxon countries have lower than average values of aid and global goods financing, in 
terms of GDP and population, but they have the highest shares of global goods on total 
bilateral ODA and bilateral ODA transfers. These countries display an increasing uniform 
pattern in ODA and GPG financing. Northern European countries have higher than average 
values for both ODA and GPGs and the lowest dispersion for the share of global goods on 
total bilateral ODA and ODA transfers. These countries also show an increasing uniformity. 
Central European and Southern European countries are less homogeneous groups with respect 
to both ODA and GPGs provision. Central European countries and Japan have ODA values 
that are about or above the average, but they have lower than average shares of global goods 
to ODA. Southern European countries have the lowest average values for all variables. These 
countries are also relatively less homogeneous, especially with respect to their share of global 
goods to GDP and ODA. 
 Table 8 adds the composition of the GPG_E spending for the same groups of countries 
in the three sub-periods. Anglo-Saxon countries, with their propensity to interventionist 
global policies, have experienced the most decisive shift from summation to weakest link 
GPGs: activities related to Crime control and Communicable disease control, which amounted 
to 17.5 per cent of total GPG_E in 1995-98, sum up to 66 per cent in 2003-2006. On the 
contrary, expenditures for environment and global stability have decreased from 71.8 to 26.8 
per cent in the same period. In a less pronounced way, the same trend has been followed by 
the North European countries, which have doubled their financing to Crime control and 
Communicable disease control (from 12 to 27 per cent), but still keep 48 per cent of their 
GPG expenditures on environment and global stability in 2003-2006. The Central European 
countries only in the last sub-period tend to conform to the pattern of expenditures of the 
above countries, they reduce less the expenditures for environment while increasing the 
shares of Knowledge and Global stability. The same pattern is followed by the countries in 
Southern Europe. Japan presents an opposite trend with respect to Anglo-Saxon countries, 
increasing its financing to the summation technology GPGs, environment and global stability.  
 Tables 6 and 7 tend to suggest that no clear principle of burden sharing is respected in 
the financing of GPGs: neither the ability-to-pay principle, when ability is measured in terms 
of GNI, nor the equal sacrifice principle is respected, when sacrifice is measured in terms of 
the per capita amount spent on GPGs, as per capita expenditures show a pattern which is 
similar to the global goods ratios to GDP. Besides, we cannot demonstrate the presence of 
free-riding behavior either: Southern European countries could either be considered as free-
riders, profiting from the other donors’ higher contribution to GPGs, or be positively 
evaluated as they do not subtract funds from development aid and poverty reduction. Finally, 
Southern European countries could be simply less equipped than other DAC donors with the 
administrative capacity to run programs for proving GPGs and could therefore prefer to 
finance them through multilateral agencies. 
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A host of considerations involving perspective benefits and genuine altruism probably 
drives the donors’ decision on how much aid to allocate to GPGs: donor-specific gains from 
other aid spending (geo-political considerations, trade and political ties), satisfaction from 
altruistic giving to alleviate poverty or to contribute to the solution of world-wide problems 
and non-rival/non-excludable benefits from GPGs. For example, Nordic countries, which 
seem to be less driven by the search for donor-specific gains from aid (Gates and Hoeffler, 
2004), have kept a generous level of financing to poor countries over time, while not 
renouncing to redirect part of it to global issues: are they just becoming less generous or are 
they leaving behind the “old school” development assistance patterns (Severino and Ray, 
2009) to search for greater coherence between aid and other dimensions of their international 
economic policies? The same caution is to applied to the Anglo-Saxon countries and to the 
US in particular. Their shift towards weakest-link GPG financing could be the attempt to 
grant stable financing against risky and disruptive events, even in the absence of cooperation 
from other countries. Alternatively, it could be the consequence of the strict pursuit of 
geopolitical and security interest, whose complementary with poor countries development is 
doubtful (Sagasti, 2005).  
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Table  7 -  Bilateral aid financing of GPG_E by groups of donors (1995-2006) 
 
1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 
 
ODA/GDP 
(%) 
GPG_E/
GDP (%) 
Share of 
GPG 
financing 
on bilateral 
aid (%) 
GPG_E/ 
bilateral 
ODAT (%) 
ODA/GDP 
(%) 
GPG_E/ 
GDP (%) 
Share of 
GPG 
financing 
on bilateral 
aid (%) 
GPG_E/ 
bilateral 
ODAT (%) 
ODA/GDP 
(%) 
GPG_E/G
DP (%) 
Share of 
GPG 
financing 
on bilateral 
aid (%) 
GPG_E/ 
bilateral 
ODAT (%) 
All countries (22) 
Average  0.296 0.035 10.882 11.443 0.352 0.040 12.472 13.578 0.432 0.049 11.812 13.278 
Rel. Std. Dev. 0.816 1.022 0.572 0.543 0.732 0.823 0.709 0.657 0.708 0.840 0.505 0.436 
Anglo-Saxon countries (6) 
Average  0.164 0.025 15.089 16.121 0.202 0.031 15.611 16.256 0.273 0.038 14.173 15.575 
Rel. Std. Dev. 0.550 1.202 0.545 0.495 0.361 0.482 0.385 0.391 0.368 0.432 0.365 0.389 
Northern European countries (4) 
Average  0.581 0.073 13.332 13.775 0.634 0.078 12.335 12.489 0.778 0.108 13.954 14.370 
Rel. Std. Dev. 0.500 0.477 0.268 0.272 0.445 0.541 0.288 0.276 0.375 0.435 0.218 0.214 
Central European Countries (7) 
Average  0.296 0.030 9.175 9.835 0.413 0.039 9.426 11.162 0.533 0.049 9.161 11.548 
Rel. Std. Dev. 0.554 0.854 0.501 0.465 0.574 0.723 0.523 0.452 0.552 0.670 0.523 0.452 
Southern European countries (4) 
Average  0.081 0.005 5.754 6.124 0.143 0.021 15.718 17.763 0.151 0.014 12.030 12.975 
Rel. Std. Dev. 0.483 1.056 0.771 0.735 0.455 0.882 1.133 1.002 0.772 0.731 0.819 0.716 
Japan 
Average  0.360 0.032 8.829 9.013 0.274 0.016 5.813 6.044 0.415 0.028 6.765 8.456 
Rel. Std. Dev. 0.030 0.000 0.205 0.200 0.142 0.221 0.246 0.240 0.135 0.168 0.131 0.184 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. Notes: ODA transfers excludes debt forgiveness items from ODA.  
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Table  8 -  The composition of GPG_E spending by groups of donors and sectors: 1995-2006 (%) 
 
 
Knowledge generation and 
dissemination 
Communicable disease 
eradication Global governance 
Crime control and peace 
building 
Global commons and 
sustainability Communications 
 
 
1995-
1998 
1999- 
2002 
2003-
2006 
1995-
1998 
1999- 
2002 
2003-
2006 
1995-
1998 
1999- 
2002 
2003-
2006 
1995-
1998 
1999- 
2002 
2003-
2006 
1995-
1998 
1999- 
2002 
2003-
2006 
1995-
1998 
1999- 
2002 
2003-
2006 
Anglo-saxon 
countries 5.33 4.28 4.00 14.10 24.68 36.42 36.96 18.41 18.85 3.47 34.54 29.62 34.90 16.77 7.99 5.24 1.31 3.12 
Nordic 
countries 
 
12.53 21.59 22.13 6.95 14.48 16.41 13.20 12.29 10.21 5.18 7.13 10.92 51.33 38.15 34.46 10.80 6.37 5.87 
Central 
European 
countries 
22.36 9.53 25.84 8.93 11.70 12.53 9.00 15.16 16.01 1.73 8.88 10.83 46.49 49.83 31.83 11.48 4.91 2.97 
Southern 
European 
countries 
11.53 6.77 11.81 5.14 4.87 11.00 2.31 7.82 10.62 7.48 46.95 27.71 38.96 27.15 33.17 34.58 6.44 5.69 
 
Japan 
 
1.09 2.53 4.10 1.34 4.53 3.86 15.36 2.50 16.05 0.00 0.56 0.59 57.64 79.22 63.98 24.58 10.65 11.42 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. Notes: data for lines sum up to 100.00 for the different sub-periods. 
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4.2 The international agencies financing of GPGs  
Multilateral aid finances about 23 per cent of total global goods (definitions E) in 2003-2006, 
with a preference for Global governance (35.6 per cent), Communicable disease eradication (37 
per cent) and, on a lesser scale, for Global commons (18.6 per cent) (Graph 3): these categories 
absorb 91.2 per cent of the total financing. The same categories, but with higher shares for the 
Global commons (39.7 per cent), were financed also in 1995-98. As the DAC countries in 
general, also international agencies have increasingly financed weakest-link GPGs (especially in 
the health sector ), but they have not stepped from  summations GPGs, like Communications and 
Global governance. 
 As Graph 6 shows, multilateral aid financing to GPGs comes primarily from the European 
Commission (35.8 per cent) and the International Development Association (IDA) of the World 
Bank (28.8 per cent), which confirms the relevant position in the financing that was observed by 
te Velde et al.(2002). The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) has 
also a relevant share of 19.8 per cent on the total financing.  
 
 
Graph  6 - International agencies financing of GPGs (E) (av. 2003-06, %) 
AfDB
0%
AfDF
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AsDB
0%
AsDF
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EC
36%
IBRD
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IDA
29%
IDB
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IDB 
Sp.Fund
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UNDP
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UNICEF
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UNAIDS
4% UNFPA0%
GFATM
20%
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. 
Legenda. AfDB:  African Development Bank; AfDF: African Development fund; AsDB: Asian Development Bank; 
AsDF: Asian Development Fund; EC: European Commission; IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
development; IDA: International Development Association; IDB: Inter-American Development Bank; IDB Sp. 
Fund: Inter-American Development Bank Special Fund; IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development; 
UNDP: United Nation Development Program; UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund; UNAIDS: Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS; UNFPA: United Nations Populations Fund GFATM: Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. 
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GPGs financing seen as a share of each organization’s total aid commitments amounts to 
about 12 per cent for the European Commission, IDA and the IDB special operations fund. The 
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) devotes almost its whole aid budget to 
Global disease control and GFATM a share of 56 per cent. 
  There are generally one or two leader donors in the provision of the different global 
goods (Graph 7): the EC for Knowledge and Crime control, GFATM for Communicable disease 
eradication, EC and IDA for the other goods. The European Commission has a much more 
diversified allocation of its funds to GPGs. It finances all categories, with a preference for Global 
governance and for Environmental goods. IDA finances the same global goods with a preference 
for Global governance. 
 
 
Graph 7 -  The contribution of multilateral agencies to different categories of GPGs (GPG_E, 
average  2003-06, %) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. 
Legenda. AfDB:  African Development Bank; AfDF: African Development fund; AsDB: Asian Development Bank; 
AsDF: Asian Development Fund; EC: European Commission; IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
development; IDA: International Development Association; IDB: Inter-American Development Bank; IDB Sp. 
Fund: Inter-American Development Bank Special Fund; IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development; 
UNDP: United Nation Development Program; UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund; UNAIDS: Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS; UNFPA: United Nations Populations Fund GFATM: Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. 
 
 
  In comparison to bilateral aid financing of GPGs, multilateral agencies have more 
concentrated financial flows and higher specialization, which do not prevent some overlapping in 
GPG provision. The framework is still far from the organisational structure that a number of 
scholars have suggested. Lodefalk and Whalley (2002) propose the creation of global agencies, 
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each focused on one specific category. Kanbur et al. (1999) and Rajaraman and Kanbur (1999) 
suggest that aid should be channeled through a common pool mechanism. Kanbur (2001) favors 
a single global organization with several sector specialist sub-agencies. 
 
 
5. Determinants of bilateral financing of aid and GPGs 
This section focuses on the bilateral aid, trying to disentangle the factors that determine the 
donors’ decision of GPG financing. The empirical literature on the factors influencing aid 
allocation16 provides two patterns of modeling: i) hybrid models and ii) donor interest/ recipient 
needs models. In hybrid models the aid flows are explained by a combination of variables 
representing political, commercial, and humanitarian motives. In donor interest models and in 
recipient needs models, the egoistic and altruistic side of the action of the donor are separated17. 
We adapt the hybrid model, focusing on the donor, separating the two stages, how much to give 
and how to allocate, and concentrating on the first one. The determinants of the financing flows 
are then to be found not just in the conditions of the recipient and among the hidden interests of 
donors, but also in the preferences and conditions of the donors18. The result is that recipients are 
considered as a unicum, which is consistent with our interest in global goods financing, where 
benefits of GPGs are potentially equal for all countries and the relevant role is that of the 
financer/producer.  
   
5.1 Determinants of bilateral ODA  
As in Reisen et al. (2004), we first analyze the source of GPGs financing, namely bilateral ODA, 
in total and as corrected by debt forgiveness. The variables considered can be roughly divided 
into two groups, i) indicators of preferences for bilateral aid and GPGs, and ii) indicators of 
constraints. The first group includes variables that summarizes the country’s position with 
respect to: (a) the financing of public expenditure; (b) the degree of openness to the rest of the 
world; (c) the preference for redistribution both within the country and (d) between countries; (e) 
the importance given to country-specific gains from aid. The second group includes variables 
related to the state of the donor’s public finances. We expect that when the budgetary situation is 
under strain, less effort can be devoted to financing development abroad: ODA becomes one of 
the first items to be cut under a budget tightening, like public investment, and it is resumed when 
the state of public finances improves.  
Table 9 presents the correlations between determinant variables, and the ratios 
ODA/GDP and ODA transfers/GDP, in the three sub-periods. There are other country-specific 
factors impact on the level of bilateral aid that we do not explicitly take into account. For 
example, some countries like Italy prefer to contribute to multilateral agencies rather than to 
bilateral aid, given the fact that multilateral programs are less labor-intensive and the structural 
                                                 
16
 For a survey see McGillivray and  White (1993).   
17
 The types of models appeared in literature are more than just the two types considered here: there are also bias 
models, stressing certain phenomena like the small-country effect or medium-income effect; developmental models, 
which, in a certain way, are similar to recipient needs model but with more stress on the role of developmental 
variables representing the ability to absorb aid; limited dependent variable models including the eligibility for aid 
choice.  
18
 Reisen et al. (2004) adopt this interpretation, when correlating GPG/ODA and ODA/GDP with variables 
representative of the donor’s preference for altruism and for public goods 
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and operational deficiencies of the departments in charge of bilateral flows (Maurini and 
Settimo, 2009).  
We don’t find any remarkable difference in the correlation strength for the two 
definitions of aid (ODA and ODAT), probably because the reasons for the expenditure are very 
similar. The three sub-periods present a certain stability in the significant variables, as if the 
variability of the composition of the aid could be explained by a constant set of reasons. In 
particular, among the variables related to openness, a large outward direct investment position 
(as in Reisen et al., 2004) and foreign direct investment outflow are significant and positively 
correlated with aid for all the sub- periods.  
 
 
Table 9 - Correlation coefficients for the ODA to GDP ratio 
 
 1995-1998° 1999-2002 2003-2006 
 
 ODA/GDP ODA 
transfers/GDP ODA/GDP 
ODA 
transfers/GDP ODA/GDP 
ODA 
transfers/GDP 
Outward direct investment 
position /GDP  
0.6029* 
(0.0104) 
0.5907* 
(0.0125) 
0.7098* 
(0.0002) 
0.7346* 
(0.0001) 
0.6985* 
(0.003) 
0.6793* 
(0.0005) 
O
pe
n
n
es
s 
to
 
re
st
 
o
f 
th
e 
w
o
rld
 
 
FDI outflow %GDP- 2006 0.4265** (0.0878) 
0.4706** 
(0.0566) 
0.6680* 
(0.0007) 
0.6770* 
(0.0005) 
0.5438* 
(0.0089) 
0.4726* 
(0.0263) 
Gini index  -0.7133* (0.0092) 
-0.8322* 
(0.0008) 
-0.6000 * 
(0.0181 ) 
-0.5092** 
(0.0813) 
-0. 5845* 
(0.0174) 
-0.5476* 
(0.0281) 
 
Al
tr
u
ism
 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
y 
Social expenditure %GDP 0.2425 (0.3322 ) 
0.3230 
(0.1911) 
0.3461 
(0.1146) 
0.1959 
(0.3822) 
0.4297* 
(0.0459) 
0.2840 
(0.2002) 
CDI index av. - 2004-06  no data no data no data no data 0.5662* (0.0075) 
0.5558* 
(0.0089 ) 
Tied aid (%) -0.2941 (0.2361) 
-0.2755 
(0.2684) 
-0.2286 
(0.3324) 
-0.1774 
(0.4542) 
-0.3865** 
(0.0923 ) 
-0.4737* 
(0.0349) 
 
Al
tr
u
ism
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
Effectiveness perceived of 
national aid 
(Eurobarometer) (a) 
 
0.7255* 
(0.0033) 
0.7630* 
(0.0015) 
Public expenditure on 
Health  
0.0052 
(0.9838) 
0.0010 
(0.9968) 
-0.0474 
(0.8339) 
-0.2016 
(0.3682) 
-0.0689 
(0.7605) 
-0.2181 
(0.3296) 
Public expenditure on 
Education  
0.5209** 
(0.0562) 
0.5033** 
(0.0666) 
0.5421* 
(0.0165) 
0.4158** 
(0.0766) 
0.5860* 
(0.0084 ) 
0.5509* 
(0.0145 ) 
General government final 
consumption expenditure 
(%GNI) 
0.8132* 
(0.0007) 
0.8077* 
(0.0008) 
0.6667* 
(0.0048) 
0.5092* 
(0.0440) 
0.5971* 
(0.0146) 
0.5294 * 
(0.0350) 
Pr
efe
re
n
ce
 
for
 
pu
bl
ic
 
go
o
ds
 
Gross domestic expenditure 
on R&D  
0.3583 
(0.1443) 
0.4812* 
(0.0432) 
0.3970** 
(0.0674) 
0.3936** 
(0.0700) 
0.4320* 
(0.0447) 
0.3811** 
(0.0801) 
General Government 
financial balance (% GDP)  
0.4964* 
(0.0361) 
0.4716* 
(0.0482) 
0.4128** 
(0.0562) 
0.4952* 
(0.0191) 
0.3710** 
(0.0892) 
0.4387* 
(0.0411) 
General government gross 
financial liabilities  
-0.0857 
(0.7354) 
0.0031 
(0.9903) 
-0.2840 
(0.2002) 
-0.2942 
(0.1839) 
-0.2422 
(0.2774) 
-0.3303 
(0.1332) 
Maastricht debt/GDP (a) 0.2238 (0.4845) 
0.2937 
(0.3541) 
-0.4676 ** 
(0.0678 ) 
-0.6059* 
(0.0129 ) 
-0.4059 
(0.1188 ) 
-0.5529* 
(0.0263 ) 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
Interest expenditure/GDP 
(a) 
-0.0364 
(0.9155) 
0.0727 
(0.8317 ) 
-0.2622 
(0.3267 ) 
-0.3358 
(0.2035 ) 
-0.4061 
(0.1331 ) 
-0.5868* 
(0.0215 ) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data.  
Notes: As in Reisen et al. (2004) we report the Spearman  correlation coefficients for period averages. * Correlation 
is significant at a 5 per cent level ** Correlation is significant at a 10 per cent level. ° Luxembourg, New Zealand, 
Ireland, Greece are not considered because of  insufficient data for that period. °° Greece and New Zealand are not 
considered because of insufficient data. (a)  EU countries only;   (c) When GPGs are correlated with ODA 
transfers/GDP, data are expressed as ratios to ODA transfers  
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 The preference for domestic inequality, as summarized by the Gini index, is negatively 
related to aid financing, meaning that countries that do not allow for much domestic 
redistribution are less involved in international redistribution. With regard to altruism in 
international relationships, a larger share of tied aid19 is negatively and significantly correlated 
with aid giving in the last interval, 2003-2006. It could be that conditionality on aid is associated 
with weaker altruism and smaller aid flows. Alternatively. the explicit decision to finance more 
extensively international programs possibly goes hand in hand with the lower necessity to buy 
internal consensus by imposing conditionality on aid. Moreover, the concern for development 
and for better quality in the relationships with other countries, as captured by the Commitment to 
Development Index20, is significantly associated with larger aid giving. Another variable related 
to altruism in international relationships, Effectiveness of national aid, expressing a great support 
to aid by the vast majority of the EU citizens (above 70% on average since 1990s), is 
significantly and positively correlated with ODA21.  
Out of the indicators of preferences for public goods, all variables, except expenditure on 
health, are significantly related to aid. As in Reisen et al. (2004), this supports the hypothesis that 
a larger government is associated with higher spending also on international programs.  
 Among the indicators for the state of public finances, the general government financial 
balance, the Maastricht debt (last two periods), and the interest expenditure (last period and only 
for ODA transfers) are significant22. This supports the hypothesis that part of the generosity in 
aid financing is explained by the availability of public saving: countries undergoing a period of 
public finance distress or reform tend to cut all more flexible budget items, including the support 
to international programs. This conclusion is shared also by te Velde et al. (2002).  
  
 5.2 Determinants of GPGs 
The analysis above is performed for the three aggregates of GPGs, adding two variables, 
population and gross national income pro capita23, as representatives of the potential direct 
benefits from GPG provision. As in Barrett (2007), we expect that a larger income and a larger 
                                                 
19
 Tied aid is defined as loans and grants which are tied to procurement of goods and services from the donor 
country and from a restricted number of countries. The literature estimates that tying raises the cost of aid projects a 
typical 15–30 percent and reduces the value of aid by 13–23 percent.  
20
 There are no data of the CDI for the first two sub-periods. 
21
 Hudson and Van Heerde (2009), over the period 1990-2007, consider both a strict (including only questions on 
development aid) and a relaxed (including even questions on poverty in general) measure of public support: they 
find non-significant relations (respectively a negative and a positive one) with ODA. The authors stress how, even if 
there is a sort of unanimous consent to public intervention, which is confirmed for national policies, it is less evident 
for foreign policies. Their finding suggests us to take both results with caution, considering the low level of 
information of the public and the vagueness and not explicitness of the surveys.  
22
 General government gross financial liabilities are not significantly correlated with aid, probably because gross 
debt data are not always comparable across countries due to different definitions or treatment of debt components. In 
particular, debt data include the funded portion of government employee pension liabilities in some OECD 
countries, including Australia and the United States. The debt position of these countries is thus overstated relative 
to countries that have large unfunded liabilities for such pensions, which according to ESA95 are not counted in the 
debt figures. 
23
 “This is because people benefit from the supply of global public goods, and their willingness to pay for 
provision—a measure of their benefit—while not determined by their income, will almost certainly increase in the 
level of their income” (Barrett, 2007), p. 113). 
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number of potential beneficiaries increase the willingness to take part in GPG financing (Table 
10).   
 
Table 10  - Correlation coefficients for the GPG ratios 
 
Spearman correlation 
GPG_E/
GDP 
GPG_M
DG/GDP 
GPG_O
ECD/GD
P 
GPG_E/
GDP 
GPG_MD
G/GDP 
GPG_OE
CD/GDP 
GPG_E
/GDP 
GPG_M
DG/GDP 
GPG_OE
CD/GDP 
 
1995-1998° 1999-2002°° 2003-2006 
Outward direct 
investment position 
/GDP  
0.4412** 
(0.0763) 
0.4877* 
(0.0470) 
0.3725 
(0.1408) 
0.5489* 
(0.0122) 
0.5955* 
(0.0056) 
0.3579 
(0.1213) 
0.6894* 
(0.0004) 
0.7019* 
(0.0003) 
0.5663* 
(0.0060) 
O
pe
n
n
es
s 
to
 
th
e 
re
st
 
o
f 
th
e 
w
o
rld
 
 
FDI outflow as a  % 
GDP  
0.4828* 
(0.0496) 
0.5686* 
(0.0138) 
0.6078* 
(0.0075) 
0.5053* 
(  0.0231) 
0.4797* 
(0.0323) 
0.2436 
(0.3007) 
0.3981** 
(0.0665) 
0.4545* 
(0.0336) 
0.3811** 
(0.0801) 
Tied aid  to LDC (%) -0.2219 (0.3762) 
-0.2611 
(0.2953) 
-0.2157 
(0.3900) 
-0.5026* 
(0.0335) 
-0.2466 
(0.3238) 
-0.2178 
(0.3854) 
-0.2932 
(0.2096) 
-0.2872 
(0.2195) 
-0.1985 
(0.4015) 
Al
tr
u
ism
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
CDI index av 2004-06 No data 0.6208* (0.0027) 
0.6312* 
(0.0022) 
0.5325* 
(0.0130) 
Public expenditure on 
Health  
-0.0155 
(0.9513) 
-0.1334 
(0.5977) 
-0.1086 
(0.6680) 
-0.0030 
(0.99) 
0.0271 
(0.9098) 
0.0647 
(0.7865) 
-0.0328 
(0.8849) 
-0.1175 
(0.6025) 
-0.1695 
(0.4508) 
Public expenditure on 
Education  
0.4813** 
(0.0814) 
0.2282 
(0.3624) 
0.3268 
(0.1857) 
0.5604* 
(0.0156) 
0.5294* 
(0.0239) 
0.4778* 
(0.0449) 
0.6035* 
(0.0062) 
0.5825* 
(0.0089) 
0.5035 
(0.0280)* 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (%GDP) 
0.7582* 
(0.0027) 
0.3639 
(0.1376) 
0.4682* 
(0.0500) 
0.5201* 
(0.0469) 
0.5112** 
(0.0515) 
0.5273* 
(0.0434) 
0.5353* 
(0.0326) 
0.5324* 
(0.0338) 
0.4735** 
(0.0639) 
Pr
efe
re
n
ce
 
for
 
 
pu
bl
ic
 
go
o
ds
 
Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D  
0.4047** 
(0.0957) 
0.3841 
(0.1156) 
0.5307* 
(0.0235) 
0.0331 
(0.8899) 
0.2947 
(0.2071) 
0.3098 
(0.1838) 
0.4410* 
(0.0399) 
0.3360 
(0.1263) 
0.3552 
(0.1048) 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
 
GDP per capita 0.5150 * (0.0287 ) 
0.4923 * 
(0.0380 ) 
0.3973 
(0.1025 ) 
0.4917* 
(0.0277) 
0.4992* 
(0.0250) 
0.4977* 
(0.0255) 
0.6849* 
(0.0004) 
0.6036* 
(0.0029) 
0.6443* 
(0.0012) 
GNI per capita°°° 
 
0.3176 
(0.2306) 
0.4029 
(0.1217) 
0.3176 
(0.2306) 
0.5907* 
(0.0125) 
  0.4461** 
(0.0727) 
0.4167** 
(0.0962)  
0.6965* 
(0.0009) 
0.5333* 
(0.0187) 
0.5509* 
(0.0145) 
 
Po
te
n
tia
l  
be
n
efi
ts
 
Population   -0.432** (0.0731) 
-0.5129* 
(0.0295) 
-0.4056** 
(0.0950) 
-0.5263* 
(0.0171) 
-0.3609 
(0.1180) 
-0.2857 
(0.2220) 
-0.2942 
(0.1839) 
-0.3123 
(0.1571) 
-0.2422 
(0.2774) 
General Government 
financial balance (% 
GDP)  
0.6677* 
(0.0025) 
0.6429* 
(0.0040) 
0.4675** 
(0.0504) 
0.5699* 
(0.0087) 
0.6647* 
(0.0014) 
0.5835* 
(0.0069) 
0.4568* 
(0.0326) 
0.5155* 
(0.0141) 
0.4195** 
(0.0519) 
General government 
gross financial 
liabilities  
-0.2033 
(0.4184) 
-0.1579 
(0.5315) 
-0.2466 
(0.3238) 
-0.5128* 
(0.0208) 
-0.3895** 
(0.0896) 
-0.4737* 
(0.0349) 
-0.3890** 
(0.0735) 
-0.4489* 
(0.0361) 
-0.3845** 
(0.0772) 
Maastricht debt/GDP 
(a) 
0.0839 
(0.7954 ) 
0.1538 
(0.6331) 
0.0979 
(0.7621) 
  -
0.4637** 
(0.0949) 
-0.4418 
(0.1138) 
-0.4110 
(0.1443) 
-0.4821* 
(0.0687) 
-0.3893 
( 0.1515) 
-0.4071 
(0.1320) 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
Interest 
expenditure/GDP (a) 
-0.0273 
(0.9366) 
0.1455 
(0.6696) 
-0.0455 
(0.8944) 
0.0352 
(0.9049) 
-0.0880 
(0.7648) 
-0.0550 
(0.8518) 
-0.5492* 
(0.0340) 
-0.4884** 
(0.0647) 
-0.5063** 
(0.0541) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. 
Notes. ° Luxembourg, New Zeland, Ireland, Greece are not considered because of  insufficient data for that 
period. °° Greece and New Zeland are not considered because of insufficient data. °°° Spain, Portugal are not 
considered because of insuficient data.  (a)  EU countries only;  * significant at 5% ** significant at 10% 
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Table 10 shows that the strategic interest component continues to be supported by the statistical 
significance of the variables included under the heading Openness to the rest of the world. The 
significance of the Commitment to Development Index confirms the idea that not only selfish 
interests move developed countries. Preference for national public goods continues to be 
significantly and positively correlated with GPGs (E aggregate), supporting the hypothesis that 
countries interested in national public goods are more in favor of GPG financing. This result is 
different from that found by Reisen et al. (2004, p. 25), where these variables are significantly 
correlated only with ODA/GDP. Our finding could be due to the overlapping role of GPGs and 
ODA in certain sectors.  
 The variables related to potential benefits from GPG financing, are significant but in 
different sub-periods: population is significant in the first period and per capita GNI in the 
following two periods.  
 The state of the public finances continues to be significantly related to GPGs financing. 
As expected, the relationship is positive for the budget balance, as in Reisen et al. (2004), and 
negative for the General government gross financial liabilities, the share of Maastricht debt and 
interest expenditure on GDP for the EU countries.  
 In conclusion, the comparison among the three aggregates of GPGs adopted shows the 
light superiority of the enlarged definition in better catching the different motives behind the 
choice of GPGs financing. 
 
 
6. Committing aid funds to GPGs  
The function describing aid funded commitments to GPGs employs one variable for each group 
of determinants reported in Table 1024, using the three definitions of GPGs. The first estimate 
refers to an unbalanced dataset of 1825 countries observed for 12 years (1995-2006):  
 
(2)  
 
where the up script j denotes the three definitions of GPGs, the subscript i denotes the ith state 
and the subscript t denotes the tth year.  
The factors of influence considered are: openness to the rest of the world, as measured by 
the outward direct investment position as a percentage of GDP (OUTW); economic liabilities, as 
measured by the General government gross financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP (FL); the 
wealth of the country, as measured by GDP (GDP); the preference for public goods, as measured 
by research and development expenditure as a percentage of GDP (R&D); between altruism, as 
measured by tied aid (TA) and the potential benefits as measured by per capita GNI (GNIpro). 
The disturbance term is specified as a two-way error component model: ittiit u++= γαε   with 
αi representing the country effect, which we assume a fixed effect, so to include cultural, 
                                                 
24
 Effectiveness of national aid will not be considered as there are not sufficient data. 
25
 Ireland, Luxembourg , Greece and New Zealand are omitted because of missing values. 
ititititti
j WUGPGF εββββββ +ΤΟ+++ΤΑ++= 65it43it2it1 GNIpro D&RGDP FL 
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religious and historic aspects, and γt - the time dummies, fixed for each year, in order to catch the 
influence of peculiar policies or events which can influence countries’ behavior.   
Because of an incomplete dataset for some countries in the whole period, the equation (2) 
is calculated first on a reduced number of variables and then on a larger number of variables, but 
for a reduced panel. At the end, the operation of including new variables and of dropping some 
countries brings to a panel composed of 15 countries. 
The results (Table 11) confirm the great importance of wealth and of potential benefits in 
the donor’s decision of GPG financing: in fact GDP is significant for all the three aggregates of 
GPGs, while per capita GNI is significant for the OECD and the E aggregates. The signs are 
also, as expected, positive for both the variables.  
The role of the financial variables is more uncertain. Financial liabilities (FL) are 
significant (and with the expected sign) only for GPG_OECD. The preference for public goods 
and the openness to the rest of the world, even if with the right sign, are not significant.  
The country specific effects play an important role: in fact more than 96 per cent of the 
variance is explained by them for the three aggregates of GPGs considered. A comparison 
among aggregates of GPGs shows that the GPG_OECD aggregate is explained by more 
heterogeneous factors. 
 Trying to find new determinants, the analysis is repeated for the EU countries only, by 
enlarging the set of variables: education expenditure (EDU) and final consumption expenditures 
(FCE) as a share of GDP, to represent the preference for public goods; the shares of interest 
expenditure (IE) and of Maastricht debt (MAA) on GDP, to represent the financial liabilities. 
Even in this case missing data brings to a reduction in the dimensions of the panel.  
 
(3) 
with ittiit u+= αε   
 
The results are summarized in Table 12 and show, for all aggregates, the primary role of wealth 
(GDP). The three aggregates seem to depend also on other aspects. In fact, by including new 
variables, we find a significant effect of the preference for public goods (OECD and MDG 
definitions), of openness to rest of the world (OECD definition) and of the financial liabilities. 
Among the financial liabilities, the interest expenditure, (IE, not significant) and the Maastricht 
debt (MAA, significant for GPG_E) have positive signs. This could be interpreted that, when 
public finances are under strain and interest expenditure and public debt grow, the government 
has less room for direct financing of GPGs and resorts to their financing through aid expenditure, 
even at the cost of some displacement of other forms of aid. When public finance conditions 
improve, there is, in principle, larger room for more explicit financing of global goods, unless 
bureaucratic, political or donor-specific benefit considerations lead to prefer the less explicit 
financing through aid to development. 
 
 
 
 
 
itti
j GNIproOUTWDUGPGF εββββββββ +++ΤΑ++++Ε+= 87654321 IE MAAGDP  FCE
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Table 11 - Determinants of GPGs financing 
 
Variables GPG_MDG GPG_E GPG_OECD GPG_MDG GPG_E GPG_OECD GPG_MDG GPG_E GPG_OECD 
          
GDP 0.000831*** 0.00163*** 0.00149*** 0.00117** 0.00109** 0.00119** 0.00141*** 0.00138*** 0.00150*** 
 (2.67e-05) (3.29e-05) (2.72e-05) (0.000449) (0.000498) (0.000488) (0.000429) (0.000446) (0.000448) 
OUTW 1.363 1.825 1.584 1.398 1.311 1.173 1.739 1.832 1.671 
 (1.435) (1.780) (1.684) (1.174) (1.370) (1.381) (1.226) (1.392) (1.375) 
R&D 4.989 12.71 18.19 12.61 6.805 11.68 12.47 5.882 11.49 
 (12.28) (12.09) (19.64) (9.748) (10.87) (20.11) (11.13) (12.17) (21.68) 
FL 0.147 -1.400 -3.012 -0.532 -1.359 -3.063 -0.437 -0.990 -2.801* 
 (1.956) (2.904) (2.860) (1.134) (1.516) (1.857) (0.912) (1.054) (1.333) 
TA    -0.100 -0.142 -0.124 -0.0905 -0.133 -0.113 
    (0.0724) (0.0955) (0.0772) (0.0705) (0.0885) (0.0688) 
GNIpro       23.87 35.77** 34.30* 
       (13.58) (15.35) (17.32) 
Obs. 216 216 216 204 204 204 180 180 180 
R-
squared 
0.606 0.809 0.797 0.456 0.440 0.379 0.506 0.512 0.433 
Number 
of id 
18 18 18 17 17 17 15 15 15 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. 
 Notes. Fixed effects estimator. 
 Variables: GDP: gross domestic product; OUTW: outward direct investment position; R&D: research and development expenditures; FL: financial liabilities; TA: tied  
              aid; GNIpro: per capita gross national. 
 USA is removed for missing data for TA, Spain and Portugal are removed for missing data for GNIpro 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12  - Determinants of GPGs financing for EU countries (1995-2006) 
 
VARIABLES GPG_E GPG_OECD GPG_MDG GPG_E GPG_OECD GPG_MDG GPG_E GPG_OECD GPG_MDG 
          
GDP 0.00131*** 0.00118*** 0.00127*** 0.00179*** 0.00154*** 0.00172*** 0.00128** 0.00106* 0.00135** 
 (0.000384) (0.000349) (0.000360) (0.000302) (0.000304) (0.000267) (0.000522) (0.000499) (0.000482) 
TA 0.0830 0.0713 0.0698 0.175* 0.142 0.159 0.153 0.116 0.140 
 (0.0934) (0.0879) (0.0841) (0.0947) (0.0999) (0.0884) (0.0985) (0.103) (0.0934) 
OUTW 0.784 0.927 0.569 0.879 1.085* 0.703 -0.0233 0.542 0.246 
 (0.794) (0.581) (0.632) (0.778) (0.591) (0.602) (0.431) (0.408) (0.415) 
MAA 2.509* 1.761 2.016 1.017 0.638 0.592 3.077 3.062 2.445 
 (1.156) (1.127) (1.148) (0.691) (0.615) (0.688) (2.609) (2.203) (2.416) 
IE    23.42 17.00 22.15 26.88 19.54 23.81 
    (15.08) (13.45) (13.96) (15.51) (12.70) (13.88) 
FCE 14.20 20.72 15.19 14.84 24.65* 16.65 33.39 42.35*** 29.89* 
 (16.86) (12.85) (14.95) (17.43) (11.25) (13.13) (18.98) (12.26) (13.76) 
EDU 6.381 -7.804 2.308 4.464 -11.09 -0.107 15.31 -2.774 6.624 
 (10.34) (7.446) (9.261) (11.86) (8.541) (10.35) (10.29) (7.124) (9.898) 
GNIpro       27.16* 23.60 18.50 
       (14.75) (14.29) (13.60) 
Constant -1250** -1160** -1208** -1648*** -1529*** -1603*** -2664*** -2452*** -2342*** 
 (475.1) (409.8) (442.4) (409.3) (346.6) (355.8) (486.1) (391.4) (375.8) 
          
Observations 156 156 156 132 132 132 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.516 0.470 0.530 0.588 0.525 0.607 0.617 0.554 0.624 
Number of id 13 13 13 11 11 11 10 10 10 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD-CRS data. 
Notes. Fixed effects estimator.  
Variables: GDP: gross domestic product; TA: tied aid; OUTW: outward direct investment position; MAA: Maastricht debt; IE: interest expenditure; FCE: final consumption 
expenditures ; EDU: education expenditure; GNIpro: per capita gross national. 
Spain and Portugal are removed for missing data for GNIpro and Norway for IE. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7. Concluding remarks 
Some patterns of behavior by donor countries seem to dominate aid financing of GPGs through 
the crowding out effect and the selection of the items of expenditure. Our results show that, 
regardless of the definition of GPGs adopted, an increasing share of aid, both bilateral and 
multilateral, has been devoted to GPGs financing in the period 1995-2006. This increase has, 
however, been lower than in the 1980s and 1990s, when, according to te Velde et al. (2002), the 
share of IPGs nearly doubled.  
From 1995 to 2006, the growth of GPGs has taken place, partly, at the expenses of other 
aid spending. Time series analysis confirms the presence of this substitution effect, showing a 
higher explanatory power of the regressions for the extended definition (GPG_E) and for aid 
transfer financing of GPGs. The displacement effect in bilateral aid is not uniform among donor 
countries and along the period analyzed. In fact, it is more relevant for the sub-period 1999-2002 
and for some European countries (France, Germany, Italy). Nordic countries, the US and Canada 
are the “best practicing” among donors, with small or no displacement. 
The increase in GPG financing has been accompanied by a process of goods’ selection by 
donors, who thus express their changes in priorities (as in te Velde et al., 2002). In many 
instances, these changes have been uncoordinated and abrupt, thus conveying the impression that 
“global actions and funding have tended to occur on an ad hoc basis, in response to highly 
visible emergencies (such as HIV) or as a result of catalytic actions by philanthropic 
organizations” (Reisen et al., 2004, p. 8).  
Among the categories of GPGs, some of those with weakest-link technologies have 
become increasingly important at the global level: Crime control/peace building and 
Communicable disease control. The increase in their financing through aid flows could be 
explained by the rich countries’ fear of an insufficient provision by poor countries, which, 
increasingly, cannot afford to pay for them. Rich countries are therefore stepping in to avoid sub-
optimal levels of provision, as foreseen by Sandler (1998), and to provide for a sort of 
“insurance” against risky and disruptive events. 
In aid financing of GPGs, we find some statistical regularities among countries, 
representative of common historical, social, and cultural factors. First, we observe a sort of free 
riding phenomenon, as we move from Anglo-Saxon countries and from Northern Europe to 
Southern Europe. Moreover, Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries tend to display 
more homogeneous patterns of global goods financing, giving rise to a certain clusterized 
homogeneity. Anglo-Saxon countries have lower than average values of aid and global goods 
financing, in terms of GDP and population, but contribute relatively more to global goods. In the 
composition of their expenditures, Anglo-Saxon countries have decisively shifted from 
summation to weakest link technology GPGs, thus conforming to their interventionist role at the 
global level. Northern European countries have higher than average values for both ODA and 
GPGs and, to a smaller extent, they follow the Anglo-Saxon countries’ pattern of expenditure. 
Central European and Southern European countries are less homogeneous groups and they tend 
to preserve their share of summation technology GPGs, as Japan also does. Further research 
needs to be conducted on these aspects, trying to include, when possible, the role of spatial 
correlation as an additional explanatory variable. 
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Looking for the reasons for cooperation versus free-riding in donor countries’ behavior, 
we identify potential determinants of the aid financed expenditure commitment to GPGs. A 
significant role is played by variables related both to constraint (variables related to the state of 
the donor’s public finances) and to preferences (openness to the rest of the world; collective 
altruism both within the country and between countries; preference for public goods; 
conditionality imposed on aid by government), even if missing data impede to find definite 
conclusions. Our results for all donors confirm the importance of the donor’s wealth and of its 
potential benefits from GPGs provision. The role of the financial variables is more uncertain. A 
comparison among different definitions of GPGs shows that the expanded GPG_OECD 
definition is explained by a larger number of heterogeneous factors. 
 When the financing supply function is estimated for European countries only, the 
significance of the aforementioned variables is confirmed. Besides, variables related to the state 
of the donor’s public finances are also significant with positive signs. This could be interpreted 
as the fact that, when public finances are under strain, the government has less room for direct 
financing of GPGs and resorts to their financing through aid expenditure, even at the cost of 
some displacement of other forms of aid. When public finance conditions improve, there is, in 
principle, larger room for more explicit financing of global goods, unless bureaucratic, political 
or donor-specific benefit considerations lead to prefer the hidden financing through aid to 
development. 
Our first result, i.e. the presence of a crowding out effect between GPGs and other aid 
spending, should suggest to separate national budgeting systems for financing GPGs and 
development and to guarantee that funding for GPGs be a complement and not a substitute to 
development aid, as advocated by many scholars. As suggested in Zedillo and Thiam (2006), the 
OECD statistics should also track expenditure on global goods by introducing a line item for 
them, including contributions that are not considered ODA. These statistics should also include a 
larger number of countries than the traditional DAC donors, as contributions to GPGs come also 
from the major developing economies. As a consequence, the international goals should be 
separated: the famous UN 0.7 % should be applied only to expenditures related to the promotion 
of human welfare and the reduction of poverty, while another target should be set for GPGs 
(Severino and Ray, 2009). 
The second result, the process of GPG selection, shows that, when the financing is 
voluntary, the strategic use of GPGs can be a strong impulse to participate in its financing. 
Traditionally, the history of aid to development has been characterized by the strategic and 
political motives of donors. This situation seems to have ended in the 1990s, according to many 
observers, but not to others, like Burnell (2004) and Mavrotas and Villanger (2006). GPGs 
represent a similar case: for instance, the choice of GPG financing can privilege those activities 
whose benefits are greater for the donors, or difficulties in coordination can give raise to free-
riding behaviors. However, strategic and opportunistic approaches to GPGs are increasingly 
inadequate, as both the global problems have increased in size and the necessary solutions have 
increased in cost (Stansfiled et al., 2002, p. 5). There is a strong need to implement effective 
international mechanisms to prioritize GPGs, to agree upon arrangements for shared financing 
and to coordinate the necessary collective action. The international public goods agenda opens 
up new and heretofore little explored dimensions of aid coordination that relate to issues of 
timing, balance, and synergy (World Bank, May 2001a).  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 – CRS sectors of destination and GPG provision 
 
GPG CRS 
code 
Sectors Description 
Human rights 15162 
15164 
Human rights 
 
 
Women’s equality 
organisations and 
institutions 
Monitoring of human rights performance; support for 
national and regional human rights bodies; protection 
of ethnic, religious and cultural minorities 
Support for institutions and organizations 
(governmental and non-governmental) working for 
gender equality and women’s empowerment. 
12250 Infectious disease 
control 
Immunisation; prevention and control of infectious 
and parasite diseases. 
Communicable 
disease control  
13040 STD control including 
HIV/AIDS 
All activities related to sexually transmitted diseases 
and HIV/AIDS control 
13010 
 
 
13030 
Population policy and 
administrative 
management 
Family planning 
Population/development policy; census work, vital 
registration; migration data 
23030 
 
 
23065 
Power 
generation/renewable 
sources  
Hydro-electric power 
plants 
Including policy, planning, development programmes, 
surveys and incentives 
23066 Geothermal energy  
23067 Solar energy  
23068 Wind power  
23069 Ocean power  
23070 Biomass Densification technologies and use of biomass for 
direct power generation 
31210 Forestry policy and 
administrative 
management 
 
31220 Forestry development Afforestation for industrial and rural consumption; 
exploitation and utilization; erosion control, 
desertification control 
31261 Fuelwood/charcoal Forestry development whose primary purpose is 
production of fuel wood and charcoal 
31310 Fishing policy and 
administrative 
management 
 
31320 Fishery development  
41010 Environmental policy 
and administrative 
management 
 
41020 Biosphere protection  
41030 Bio-diversity  
Global commons 
and 
sustainability 
41040 Site preservation Applies to unique cultural landscape; including 
sites/objects of historical, archeological, aesthetic, 
scientific or educational value 
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15110 Economic and 
development 
policy/planning 
Macro-economic, fiscal and monetary policy and 
planning; social planning; economic and social 
analysis and forecasting; development planning and 
preparation of structural reforms; organizational 
development; support to ministries involved in aid co-
ordination 
24010 Financial policy and 
administrative 
management 
Finance sector policy, planning and programs; 
institution capacity building and advice; financial 
markets and systems 
24020 Monetary institutions Central banks. 
33110 Trade policy and 
administrative 
management 
Trade policy and planning; support to ministries and 
departments responsible for trade policy; trade-related 
legislation and regulatory reforms; policy analysis and 
implementation of multilateral trade agreements 
Global 
governance 
33140 Multilateral trade 
negotiations 
Support developing countries’ effective participation 
in multilateral trade negotiations 
11182 Educational research 
 
 
12182 Medical research  
16062 Statistical capacity 
building 
 
23082 Energy research  
31182 Agricultural research  
31282 Forestry research  
31382 Fishery research  
32182 Technological research 
and development 
 
41082 Environmental research  
Knowledge 
generation and 
dissemination 
43082 Research/scientific 
institutions 
 
22010 Communications 
policy and 
administrative 
management 
Communications sector policy, planning and 
programs; institution capacity building and advice; 
including postal services development; 
Communications 
22020 
 
15163 
Telecommunications 
 
Free flow of 
information 
Telephone networks, telecommunication satellites, 
earth stations 
Uncensored flow of information on public issues 
16063 Narcotics control In-country and customs controls including training of 
the police; educational programs and awareness 
campaigns to restrict narcotics traffic and in-country 
distribution. 
31165 Agricultural alternative 
development 
Projects to reduce illicit drug cultivation through other 
agricultural marketing and production opportunities 
Crime control 
and global peace 
 
 
43050 
 
 
15220 
 
 
15230 
Non-agricultural 
alternative developm. 
Civilian peace-
building, conflict 
prevention and 
resolution 
Post-conflict peace-
building (UN) 
Projects to reduce illicit drug cultivation through, for 
example, non-agricultural income opportunities 
 
Support for civilian activities related to peace 
building, conflict prevention/resolution, including 
capacity building, monitoring, dialogue. 
Participation in the post-conflict peace-building phase 
of United Nations peace operations. 
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Table A.2 – Definitions of global public goods (CRS sectors) 
 
 World 
Bank 
(2001) 
te Velde et 
al. (2002) 
REISEN 
ET AL. 
(2004) 
GPG_MD
G 
GPG_E 
Knowledge generation and 
dissemination 
     
11182:edu resources √  √ √ √ 
31182: agri resources √ √ √ √ √ 
23082: energy resources 
 √ √ √ √ 
41082: environmental reearch. √ √ √ √ √ 
12182: medical resources √  √ √ √ 
31282: forestry resources 
  √ √ √ 
43082: research and scientific   
            instititutions 
√ √ √ √ √ 
16062: statistical capacity √ √ √ √ √ 
31382: fishery resources 
  √ √ √ 
32182: technological resources √ √ √ √ √ 
16061: culture and recreation 
 √    
Human rights 
     
15162: human rights 
  √   
15164: women's equality 
  √   
Communicable disease 
eradication 
     
12250: infectious diseases control √ √ √ √ √ 
13040: STD control √ √ √ √ √ 
Global governance      
15110: economic policy 
  √ √ √ 
24010: financial policy 
  √ √ √ 
24020: monetary institutions 
  √ √ √ 
33110: trade policy 
  √ √ √ 
33140: multilateral trade  
            negotiations   
   √ √ 
Crime control/peace building 
     
31165: agri alternative 
  √  √ 
16063: narcotics control 
 √ √  √ 
43050: no-agri alternative 
  √  √ 
15230: post-conflict peace building √ √   √ 
15240: reintegration and SALW 
             control 
√ √    
72010: emergency assistance √     
15250: land mine clearance √     
73010: reconstruction relief √     
43040: rural development √     
72030: aid to refugees √     
15220: civilian peace-building,  
            conflict prevention and  
             resolution 
    √ 
Global commons and      
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sustainability 
41031: bio diversity √ √ √ √ √ 
23070: biomass √  √ √ √ 
41020: bio spere √ √ √ √ √ 
41010: environmental policy 
 √ √ √ √ 
31310: fishing policy √ √ √ √ √ 
31320: fishery development √ √ √ √ √ 
31220: forestery development √ √ √ √ √ 
31210: forestry policy √ √ √ √ √ 
13010: population policy 
  √ √ √ 
23030: power generation 
  √ √ √ 
23066: geothermal energy √  √ √ √ 
41040: site preservation 
 √ √ √ √ 
23068: wind power √  √ √ √ 
23067: solar energy √  √ √ √ 
23069: ocean power 
  √ √ √ 
14040: river development √ √    
14050: waste management 
 √    
23081: energy education 
 √    
41050: flood prevention 
 √    
41081: environmental education 
 √    
14010: water resources policy √ √    
14015: water res. protection √ √    
13030: family planning 
  √   
23065: hydro plants 
  √   
31261: fuel wood/charcoal 
  √   
Communications 
     
22010: communication policy 
    √ 
22020: telecommunications 
    √ 
15163: free flow of information 
 √  √ √ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
